CDG 29 Aussies at Buna, 1942 – Outcome and Analysis

November Issue Web Extra! Until now, ACG readers had to wait two issues before finding out the solution to our popular You Command Combat Decision Games. Now, we will begin posting the solution and an analysis of the historical outcome at armchairgeneral.com shortly after the respective due date for submissions of Reader Solutions. Here is the historical outcome and an analysis for You Command CDG #29, “Aussies at Buna, 1942,” November 2008 issue.

Aussies at Buna, 1942
The November 2008 issue of Armchair General magazine presented the Combat Decision Game “Aussies at Buna, 1942.” This CDG placed readers in the role of Lieutenant Colonel C.J. “Clem” Cummings, commander of the Australian 9th Battalion, 18th Infantry Brigade. Cummings’ mission was to eliminate Japanese defenses southeast of Buna, New Guinea, and capture two key Japanese-held airfields. Allied Southwest Pacific Area commander General Douglas MacArthur was desperately anxious to use the airfields and the Gona-Sanananda-Buna area along New Guinea’s northern coast as a springboard for an “island-hopping” campaign that ultimately would take him back to the Philippines. American and Australian troops, however, were making frustratingly little progress in November and December 1942 – the island’s forbidding jungle was proving to be as much of an enemy as the die-hard Japanese defenders. MacArthur’s bold plan to defend Australia by taking offensive action in New Guinea was in danger of becoming a costly failure.

Historical Outcome
One reason MacArthur’s forces were having difficulties assaulting Gona, Sanananda and Buna was that they were not prepared for the number of Japanese they would face. Grossly underestimating the enemy’s strength, Allied intelligence had reported that there were only 1,500 to 2,000 defenders split among the three strongholds. Australian and American troops, however, encountered at least three times that number – 6,000 Japanese soldiers and Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) marines. Additionally, intelligence analysts had assumed that the swampy terrain surrounding the strongholds would prevent the Japanese from building formidable fortifications – but the Allies quickly discovered the fallacy of that assumption after launching their initial attacks in November.

The Japanese, as they would do on Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and countless other Pacific islands targeted by the Allies, used skill and ingenuity to construct well-camouflaged bunkers and fighting positions that were nearly impervious to all but a direct artillery hit. Furthermore, they cleverly positioned these fortifications to provide deadly interlocking fires that shredded the ranks of their attackers. The Allies began measuring advances in mere yards, as their infantrymen typically had to clear each enemy position with grenades and small arms. By the time Cummings’ men took over the attack against Buna on December 18, the Japanese defenders had already defeated the Americans’ every attempt to capture the stronghold.

Cummings’ troops, however, enjoyed some distinct advantages over their American counterparts. In addition to the assistance they received from the platoon of Bren Gun Carriers, the Australian infantrymen were aided by newly arrived Stuart tanks – the first ones to take part in the operation. The mobility and light armor protection of these vehicles were more than adequate for close-combat operations in jungle terrain against an enemy with few anti-tank weapons. The battery of U.S. 105 mm artillery and the 81 mm mortar company also added much needed “punch” to the Australians’ fire support.

Cummings decided to launch a battalion frontal attack (Course of Action Three) against the Japanese positions, aligning C Company, B Company, A Company and D Company from left to right. Initially he employed the Bren Gun Carriers as fire support weapons (clearing a swath through the kunai grass with their concentrated machine-gun fire) but later moved them forward to support the infantry assault. He ordered the tanks to advance with the infantry companies, taking advantage of their armor protection and 37 mm main guns. At 6:50 a.m. on December 18, supporting artillery and mortars fired a 10-minute barrage against known Japanese positions before Cummings’ infantry companies initiated their general assault at 7 a.m.

While companies A and D made good progress on the right of Cummings’ line, companies B and especially C suffered heavy casualties and advanced slowly. Even with tank support, the infantrymen had difficulty taking the Japanese defenses, particularly the coconut log bunkers. Just as the Americans had before them, the Australians discovered that almost every bunker had to be cleared methodically with grenades and small arms. Casualties were heavy; C Company lost 46 of its 87 men in the first 10 minutes of the attack while gaining only 100 yards. Cummings soon shifted the majority of his tanks to his left flank to help the assault move forward.

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