April 26, 2004April 26, 2004
We also would like to present you
memoirs of Soviet intelligence leader Sudoplatov P.A. "Special operations.
Lubyanka and Kremlin. 1930-50th years" which related to operation "Mars".
"Monastery" was the most important radio game. Initially,
"Monastery" operation was performed by our group and Secret-Political
Department of NKVD, then from July of 1941 we cooperated with GRU [Main
Intelligence Department (Military Intelligence of Ministry of Defense) – remark
of Andrey]. The
aim of "Monastery" operation was to pierce into the spy net of Abver (German
Military Intelligence Service-AMVAS) operating on the Soviet territory. We
created pro-German anti-Soviet organization for this, which tried to find
contacts with German high command. In spite of repressions of 1920th and 1930th
lots of representatives of Russian aristocracy were alive but they were totally
under observation and some of them became our important agents and noses…
Our agent Alexander Dem’yanov was born in
noble family, some his relatives took part in the Civil War on anti-Communist
side and others were known by some famous anti-Soviet leaders.
Alexander Dem’yanov was forced to become NKVD agent in 1929 as a result of NKVD
action. His task was to determine contacts between noblemen, remaining in
the USSR, and foreign anti-Soviet emigration and to prevent terrorist acts…
He established himself as an electrical engineer on Moscow film studio and became well known in cultural elite of
Moscow…
Finally, the officials of German embassy and agents of Abver shoed their
serious interest to Alexander Dem’yanov…
At the beginning of the war Dem’yanov had 10-year experience of work as NKVD
agent. At that he took part in serious counter-intelligence operations when he
had to contact with people who didn’t hide their anti-Soviet view…
In July, 1941 Gorlinskiy, - the Chief of Secret-Political Department of NKVD,
and me asked for Beriya to use Dem’yanov for performing of "Monastery"
operation in enemy’s rear. Poet Sadovskiy and sculptor Sidorov, which had
learned in Germany in the past and were well-known in German secret services,
also took part in "Monastery" operation for trustworthiness…
We wanted to make active pro-German underground organization "Throne", which
could offer its help to German high command if the leaders of this organization
would get posts in a new anti-Communist organization on occupied territories.
We expected to determine German agents in the USSR and to pierce into the
German spy net in the USSR… "Throne" and "Monastery" operations are classical
examples of high level professional work; these operations are descripted in
manuals and are studied in special schools, of course without remarks on real
names of agents who took part in these operations.
Radio game which initially had been planned for determination of people
collaborated with Germans, actually developed into confrontation between the
NKVD and Abver.
After careful training, Dem’yanov ("Goene") crossed frontline in December,
1941, as a representative of pro-German anti-Soviet organization "Throne". Local
Abver group didn’t believe him (during crossing of frontline Dem’yanov
successfully passed through a minefield he had been unaware of which). After
lots of tests and even after faked shooting, they sent Dem’yanov in higher
level Abver group in Smolensk. The Germans inquired information about Dem’yanov
from Russian emigration and also knew that he had been known for German Intelligence
when he lived in Moscow before the war. The Germans put trusted in him and gave
code-name "Max".
Dem’yanov finished school of Abver ... and got mission: to live in Moscow and
to create a spy net with purposes – to penetrate in headquarters of the Red
Army and to organize sabotage on railroads.
In February, 1942 Dem’yanov was parachuted on the Soviet territory accompanied
by two other German agents. Alexander quickly accustomed himself to duty of
chief of Abver operations in Moscow. Both his assistants were arrested soon.
Germans began to send couriers for connection with "Max". We made most part of
these couriers a "double"-agents, some ones were arrested. We detained more
than 50 agents of Abver in total, who were sent for connection…
We let some Abver agents especially from former Baltic States to return in
Abver headquarters on conditions that they would report about successful work
of the German spy net in Moscow…
Dem’yanov "became" a junior signal officer in the General Staff of Red Army…
Later operation became an important channel of misinformation. Radio game with
Abver became more intense…
Dem’yanov managed to give the impression of his group to make a sabotage action
on the railroad in Gorkiy vicinity. For confirming sabotage and trust for
Dem’yanov, we organized some messages in newspapers about sabotage on
railroads.
In the German archives "Monastery" operation has name "Case of agent "Max". In
his memoirs "Service" Gelen writes about large significance of agent "Max"
who was the main source of strategic military information about plans of the
Soviet High Command for the most difficult years of war. He even reproaches
Wehrmach command, which ignored timely coming radio messages of "Max" from
Moscow about the Counter Offensive of Soviet troops. American intelligence
didn’t believe for Gelen and in some articles directly said that German
intelligence had become a victim of NKVD operations. But Gelen continued to
contend that work of "Max" had been an example of one of the most excellent
operations of Abver during the war.
The Chief of Intelligence of SD Walter Shellenberg writes in his memoirs that
the source which had been close to Rokossovskiy gave important information.
That time "Max" was a signal-officer in the headquarters of Rokossovskiy – a
commander of the Byelorussian Front in that time. According to Shellenberg, the
officer who was close to Rokosovskiy had anti-Soviet view and hated Stalin
because that officer had become a victim of repressions in 30th and was in
prison for two years.
Abver Command supposed that "Max" was an important and reliable spy -
he got German "Iron Cross with swords", we rewarded him with
"Order of Red Star"...
From the German archival data we knew that command of Wehrmach had made some fatal
mistakes partly as a result of complete trust to information of Abver, which
was received from sources in the Soviet High Command. Misinformation, which was
transmitted by "Goene" - "Max", was prepared in Operational
Department of the General Staff with the help of one of its leaders, Shtemenko.
Then this misinformation was approved Intelligence Department of the General
Staff and was transmitted to NKVD for providing of convincing circumstances.
According to Shtemenko’s plans, important operations of the Red Army really
were performed in 1942-43 in those places, where "Goene" -
"Max" had "predicted" ones for Germans. But they had diversionary,
auxiliary significance.
Sometimes misinformation had strategic significance. So, on the 4th of November
"Goene" - "Max" reported that Red Army would begin advance on
the 15th of November not on the Stalingrad direction, but on the Northern
Caucasus and Rzhev ones. The Germans waited for an advance against Rzhev and
repelled it. But encirclement of Paulus’s troops in Stalingrad became a
complete surprise for Germans.
Zhukov didn't know about this intelligence operation and paid a high price for
it - thousands and thousands of our soldiers were killed during Rzhev advance
under command of Zhukov. Zhukov writes in his memoirs that a result of advance
was unsuccessful. But he didn't know (and never knew about it later) that
Germans had been warned about our advance on Rzhev direction and sent in that
region a large amount of troops...
A part of our information, which we had been sending to Berlin, returned to us
from Germans (and from the Western Allies
intelligence sources which also got that information from Germans). In many
cases we checked this information and knew that it had been our own misinformation
which "Goene" - "Max" sent for Germans. "
Translated in English by Andrey and AMVAS.
Slight alterations were made in original text - some large phrases were paraphrased (marked in Italic style), some auxiliary information was replaced by omission points ("…")
