CDG 37 – Rommel in World War I, 1917

Web Extra! Until recently, ACG readers had to wait two issues to find out the solution to our popular You Command Combat Decision Games. Now we are posting the historical outcome and analysis at ArmchairGeneral.com shortly after the respective due date for submissions of Reader Solutions. Here is the outcome for You Command CDG #37, “Rommel in World War I, 1917" March 2010 issue.

The March 2010 issue of Armchair General® presented the Combat Decision Game “Rommel in World War I, 1917.” This CDG placed readers in the role of Lieutenant Erwin Rommel, commander of an abteilung (detachment) of the Württemburg Mountain Battalion of the Imperial German Army’s Alpenkorps fighting on World War I’s Eastern Front. Rommel – Germany’s future “Desert Fox” – was given the mission to attack and seize Mount Cosna, a key position in the Carpathian Mountains defended by entrenched Romanian army soldiers. If successful, his men could help shatter the Carpathian defensive line, open the way to the rich Danube Basin and the vital resources Germany desperately needed to continue the war, and possibly knock Romania out of the conflict.

The fighting on World War I’s Eastern Front between the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary, later joined by Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) and Russia (allied with Romania beginning in 1916) broke out in 1914, seesawing back and forth along the 1,200 miles between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. By 1917 Russian armies were exhausted and Romanian forces were teetering on the brink of collapse. Only the rugged terrain of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps, through which the Romanian front ran, had thus far prevented a Central Powers breakthrough. Germany’s strategy was to defeat Russia and Romania, and then transfer hundreds of thousands of troops from the Eastern Front to the decisive Western Front. Rommel’s attack on Mount Cosna on August 11, 1917, presented a key opportunity to hasten victory on the Eastern Front by accelerating Romania’s collapse.

HISTORICAL OUTCOME
Rommel chose to avoid the main strength of the Romanian army by using a sweeping attack against the enemy’s right flank (Course of Action One: Left Hook). He positioned a portion of his infantry and machine guns directly opposite the enemy trench lines to fix the Romanians’ attention to the front, while he led the bulk of his abteilung through the woods and broken terrain to the north. The approach march was arduous – especially for the MG 08/15 machine-gunners carrying loads of more than 100 pounds – but it was a tribute to the conditioning and training of Rommel’s Alpenkorps troops. Skillful use of the terrain helped his soldiers avoid Romanian outposts as they moved into attack positions shortly before noon on August 11.

Upon hearing shots fired by the fixing force facing the trenches, Rommel ordered his machine guns to rake the enemy positions and then he launched his infantry at them. His leading elements broke through the Romanians’ defensive zone but became pinned down by heavy enemy fire. As he weighed his next move – he even considered withdrawing – one of his subordinate commanders took the initiative and led an attack against the enemy positions to Rommel’s right, causing the resistance against Rommel to crumble. By 2 p.m. Rommel’s trench attack had succeeded, and his men continued the assault toward Mount Cosna. As his abteilung advanced, Rommel heard shots fired on the opposite slope – Captain Gössler’s abteilung, after successfully infiltrating around the enemy’s left flank, was attacking Mount Cosna. Caught between the two detachments, the Romanian defenders abandoned Mount Cosna and it fell to the Germans.

Victories such as that won by Rommel in August 1917 helped propel the Central Powers to triumph on the Eastern Front. Romania surrendered in December 1917, while Russia collapsed into the chaos of the Bolshevik Revolution and left the war in March 1918. Yet success on the Eastern Front was not enough to win the war; Germany lost World War I when it was defeated on the Western Front in November 1918. Two decades later Erwin Rommel would be given an even more important opportunity to lead German troops in battle during World War II.

READER SOLUTIONS
ACG judges based their selections for winning Reader Solutions and those receiving honorable mention on submissions that chose Course of Action One: Left Hook, or those whose explanations demonstrated a solid understanding of World War I mountain warfare. (See “After Action Report.”) By fixing the Romanians’ attention to the front with only part of Rommel’s abteilung, COA One allowed the bulk of his German forces to avoid the strongest enemy defenses and move left around the trench lines to mass against the Romanians’ vulnerable right flank. This plan permitted the detachment’s small-unit commanders to use the varied terrain to their best advantage as they maneuvered. Rommel’s platoon of man-portable machine guns provided his attacking force with mobile firepower to overwhelm enemy resistance and help propel his infantry advance. COA One did not require precise coordination between Rommel and Gössler, but it did facilitate Gössler’s flank attack toward Mount Cosna by drawing the Romanians’ attention to the front fixing force and Rommel’s flank attack.

Course of Action Two: Frontal Attack simply repeated the futile “trench warfare” tactics that were characteristic of the bloody carnage on World War I’s Western Front. This plan ignored the possibilities that were available to restore maneuver to warfare on the vast Eastern Front, where troop density was low, and it surrendered the advantage of potential multiple axes of advance presented by the varied mountain terrain. COA Two entailed attacking the Romanians at their strongest point, and thus it risked incurring the most casualties and could have resulted in a German defeat.

Course of Action Three: Double Envelopment was overly complicated, required precise coordination of the two attacking forces, and relied on split-second timing of the supporting artillery and mortar barrages. Furthermore, this plan did not establish an overall tactical commander for the independently led attacking forces – a vital requirement to ensure accurate coordination. It exposed both German detachments to possible defeat in detail by the entrenched Romanians, who occupied a strongly fortified central position from which they could freely move troops to either of their threatened flanks.

AFTER ACTION REPORT
Key Points for World War I Mountain Warfare

• Train troops rigorously to fight in the challenging and harsh mountain conditions.
• Encourage subordinates’ initiative to take full advantage of fleeting battlefield opportunities.
• Take advantage of the opportunity to maneuver presented by mountain terrain – leave “trench warfare” on the Western Front.
• Effectively use the varied mountain terrain to avoid assaulting enemy trenches and strongpoints.
• Accompany and support infantry attacks with mobile firepower (portable machine guns).
• Coordinate artillery and mortar fires to support the attack and to target strongpoints and enemy troop concentrations.