CDG Solution Winners #22: Scud Busting in Iraq

Editorial Staff

Robert Allen
10th Mountain Division

The key to a successful raid is  simple plan that incorporates speed, surprise and violence of action.  Using the vehicles and their mounted weapons provides both speed and firepower.  The best solution is COA #2 with one modification.  Approaching from the west, the heavy group’s weapons will easily cut through the wooden buildings, killing or incapacitating the occupants and preventing them from interfering with the demolition team.  Approaching from the north, the light group can break through the gates (the weakest point of the fence), use the hard packed road for a speedy attack and withdrawal, and cross the shortest possible distance to the communications equipment from outside of the fence.  Approaching from the north also prevents the light group from advancing into the supporting fires of the heavy group.  The light group’s machine guns can establish a local support by fire position ensuring the demo team can set the charges without Iraqi interference.

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William Allred
Richardson, TX

COA 2 is the only COA that effectively allows our forces to capitalize on our two greatest assets- speed and firepower.  COA 1 completely abandons our firepower and means of escape. the Iraqis won’t sit idle once they hear our explosions go off.  COA 3 sounds nice, but for the fact that it leaves the most critical aspect of the operation, the demolitions men, with horribly little defensive power.  COA 2 leaves our Demo men with more of the necessary firepower and a clear something else to shoot at, as we definitely don’t want the less-defended Demo men to be the ones drawing fire.  It is also more flexible, which allows the men to take advantage of their commando training and react to /exploit growing situations.

Stewart Cattroll
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada

I decided to utilize COA 2: The Two Pronged Mounted Attack.  The first course of action leaves our soldiers vulnerable to detection and ambush by any Iraqi forces that may be in the area.  If the soldiers are caught out in the open and on foot they might be annihilated.  It is an unnecessary risk and will force our soldiers to walk at lease 4 KM; any wounded might not be able to be recovered were something to go wrong. The third course of action is not suitable as it not only requires exact timing to be successful but also diffuses our strength over too broad of an area.  The second course of action allows us to concentrate all of our heavy firepower onto one decisive point that is punched through the chain link fences.  Moreover, this course of action remains true to Major Stirling’s proven tactic of hitting the enemy hard and fast and then withdrawing into the desert before they can react.