MacArthur Myth

By Mo Ludan

I wish to comment on the following issues re: Richard B. Frank’s “Pacific Battle Casualties and the MacArthur Myth” (Armchair General magazine, July 2006).

Issue #1: “The JCS authorized a three-phased campaign that began in August 1942… In 1943, however, Nimitz’s local commander, Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr and his South Pacific command fell under MacArthur’s authority. Accordingly, the casualties sustained in the first phase of the South Pacific campaign rightfully accrue to Nimitz, and those for the following two phases accrue to MacArthur.”

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Comment: Although his powerful Third Fleet provided support to the Leyte Landing, Halsey took direct orders from Nimitz not only during the retaking of the Philippines but throughout the Pacific campaign.

Issue #2: “Based on available information, an estimate of Filipino casualties would be at least 60,000 including a minimum of 10,000 deaths.”

Comment: Unbeknownst to MacArthur and Filipino leader Manuel Quezon, Washington had earlier written off the Philippines in favor of focusing the war effort on Europe. In fact, Washington did not seriously plan a rescue. Since the decision to abandon the Philippines had been decided earlier in Washington, MacArthur could hardly be blamed for subsequent losses incurred in the defense of the doomed islands. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall kept assuring MacArthur and Quezon that help was “on the way.”

Issue #3: “These facts illustrate that a valid comparison of losses under MacArthur and Nimitz involves fixing boundaries in both time and command jurisdiction.”

Comment: Should we therefore start the timeline from the moment MacArthur and Nimitz were both given theater commands for a consistent “theater commander to theater commander” comparison?

Soon after Japan’s entry into the war on December 7, 1941, the Allies decided to unify command in the South West Pacific with the appointment of Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, a British, as theater commander of what was known as the ABDA area (American, British, Dutch, and Australian). His deputy, an American admiral named Thomas C. Hart, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, directed all naval forces independent of MacArthur, who was technically subordinate in rank to Wavell.

Issue #4: “The United States Navy sustained 57,149 casualties in the Pacific. Since … these losses resulted from the air-sea battles that annihilated the IJN and sank Japan’s merchant marine, a valid comparison of casualties in the two Pacific theaters must exclude Navy losses.”

Comment: I feel that the war mission of every theater commander is to decisively defeat the enemy by whatever means available in his authority- at land, sea, or air. To exclude air-sea battle casualties sustained under his command would therefore present an incomplete assessment of his combat loss role.

Issue #5: “The same source indicated that the beginning strength of the Republic of the Philippines armed forces was about 120,000…..”

Comment: The “Republic of the Philippines” did not exist until after July 4, 1946 when the Philippines, a U.S. colony, gained her independence. Virtually all records were destroyed during the country’s liberation. One wonders about the accuracy of the author’s sources from the two post-war Manila agencies (Office of the Adjutant General and National Historical Institute). How did these records survive the war and how could they be at variance with authoritative U.S. military sources?

Issue #6: “Casualties in MacArthur’s recapture of the Philippines nearly equaled Nimitz’s losses at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.”

Comment: Total casualties in the Philippines numbered 65,000, about half the 118,000 lost in Iwo Jima and Okinawa. These losses must be seen in light of enemy casualties inflicted by the two commanders. In the Philippines, Japan lost 350,000 men vs. 130,000 in Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

MacArthur‘s troops slogged their way through a Philippine land area totaling 115,800 sq. miles vs. 466 sq. miles secured by Nimitz’s equally tough soldiers in Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Tables 1, 2, and 3 attempt to underscore MacArthur’s economy of ground losses per sq. mile of ground contested (although one can argue for Nimitz that fighting intensifies and casualties rise dramatically as the battle zone nears the enemy’s homeland, e.g., Okinawa, Iwo Jima). Due to his vast territory, MacArthur faced a much larger enemy force. The Philippine island of Luzon alone was defended by 285,000 Japanese ground troops, nearly equal the total ground forces faced by Nimitz in his entire Pacific campaign.

Conclusion: Regardless of how one examines the casualty record of these two brilliant commanders, we must not overlook the fact that Nimitz and MacArthur performed superbly, in spite of being relegated to subsidiary roles vis-à-vis their European counterparts. They cooperated with each other at every step of the way toward their common goal: the defeat of Japan. Each commander covered the other’s flank. One would not have succeeded without the other.

 

Endnotes:

Issue #1 “While (MacArthur) was Commander-in-Chief within his own SW Pacific Theatre, Halsey’s Third Fleet and naval support from the Central and South Pacific areas were distinctly without his jurisdiction. He had absolutely no authority over them.“ Frazier Hunt, “The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur”. Devin-Adair. New York. 1954.

“Bill Halsey’s Third Fleet of eighteen aircraft carriers, six battleships, seventeen cruisers, and sixty-four destroyers were……under Admiral Nimitz’s orders… Halsey and his powerful Third Fleet would be operating independently of MacArthur, continuing to take their orders from Nimitz at Pearl Harbor.” William B. Breuer, “Retaking the Philippines,” St. Martin’s Press. New York. 1986.

Issue #2 “Indeed, a crucial decision had been reached in Washington. America’s first priority would be the defeat of Nazi Germany. The full brunt of Uncle Sam’s military power would be unleashed against the Germans, not the Japanese. That crucial secret was kept from the commander most affected – Douglas MacArthur.” Wm B. Breuer, “MacArthur’s Undercover War.” J. Wiley. N.Y. 1995.

Marshall cabled MacArthur: “A stream of four-engine bombers is en route… another stream of similar bombers started today for Hawaii… Two bomber groups leave next week.” FDR promised Quezon: “I can assure you that every vessel available is bearing the strength that will eventually crush the enemy and liberate your native land.” But not a single American soldier, airplane, or ship ever reached the Philippines. Breuer, Wm. “Retaking the Philippines.” op. cit.

Issue #3 “Proposed by Marshall, ABDA was a desperate measure to try to organize a scattering of Allied units under a unified command… at Marshall’s suggestion, Field Marshal Wavell was chosen to serve as Supreme Commander.” Harry A. Gailey, “The War in the Pacific.” Presidio Press. Novato. 1995.

It was not until April 18, 1942, one month and a day after MacArthur arrived in Australia from his escape from Corregidor (Allies’ last outpost in the Far East that fell on May 6 – ed), that the large South Pacific area once allotted to Wavell in December 1941 would now form the new boundaries of his SW Pacific theater. Meantime, Nimitz was given command of Pacific Ocean Area theater. Hunt, F., op. cit. Other sources: Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, ed., “War Diaries 1935–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke.” Phoenix Press. London. 2001; http://www.nzetc.org/ (New Zealand Electronic Text Center)

Issue #6 “At that time there were almost 260,000 Japanese troops in Luzon which was not far from the Sixth Army Intelligence estimate of 234,5000 on 5 December (1944)… There were also about 25,000 naval ground troops divided between Manila, Clark Air Field, and Legaspi under the command of Admiral Denshicho Okochi.” Samuel Eliot Morison, “The Liberation of the Philippines.” Little Brown & Company. Boston. 1959.

“Total American ground casualties on Okinawa were put at 65,631 including 7,300 dead. Naval casualties afloat were estimated at 27,000 men, with 4,907 killed on the U.S. ships.” Hunt, F., p. 387, op. cit

 

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MacArthur* Table 1

Land Battles (World War II name)	Square Miles
Leyte, Bismarck Archipleago	25,786
New Guinea (Papua, W. Irian/Dutch East Indies or DEI)	316,000
Luzon, Mindoro, Mindanao, rest of Philippines	113,014
Borneo, Sulawesi (Celebes, Moluccas), Java	364,127
TOTAL	818,927

 Nimitz* Table 2

Land Battles (World War II name)	Square Miles
Micronesia (Caroline Is.), Kiribati (Gilbert, Tarawa)	534
Volcano Is, Ryukyus, Marianas, Solomons, Palau, other	18,347
Aleutians, Vanuatu (New Hebrides),Taiwan (Formosa)	25,428
TOTAL	44,309

* excludes a) Australia and New Zealand in MacArthur’s zone, and b) Hawaiian Islands in Nimitz’s theater.

 .   Table 3

Ground Casualties: author’s numbers	MacArthur	Nimiitz
 U.S. casualties	117,714	108,881
 Allied casualties	78,947	25
 Combined casualties CS	**196,681	***108,906
 Sq. Miles (ground) SM	818,927	30,409
Ground casualty ratio  CS/SMÂ	0.24 casualties per sq. mi.	2.45 casualties per sq. mi.

** includes 60,000 American and Filipino defenders in Bataan, Corregidor + 18,541 Australian and New Zealand troops

*** excludes 57,149 air-sea casualties

 

 

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