Dr. Seuss and the Operational Art of War

"So you see! There’s no end to the thing you might know, depending how far beyond Zebra you go." – Dr. Seuss, On Beyond Zebra.

It may seem unusual to begin an article on military theory with a quote from an author normally associated with children’s books. Dr. Seuss, however, was a genius whose wisdom extends beyond that of life’s early lessons, and whose thoughts have application far beyond the kindergarten classroom. The above quote, from the classic On Beyond Zebra, explains the need to look beyond the present familiar and search for the future unknown.

Military experts, enamored of quick solutions and easy formulas for success, would do well to heed Dr. Seuss’ words. It is imperative that professional malaise and ignorance of potential threats not stagnate critical thinking among military leaders. Consider the historical precedent set by the devastation unleashed by Coalition Forces upon the Iraqi Army during Desert Storm in 1991. That war witnessed two events-the apex of the AirLand Battle concept and the false conclusion that future US opponents would directly confront American forces in conventional battle. As a result of that conclusion, the United States military was unprepared for 21st century asymmetric warfare in a COIN (counterinsurgency) environment.

It has become cliché to state that 9/11 changed the world in general and the military in particular. The subsequent transformation of the US armed forces from a Cold War force into a lean, rapidly deployable organization is but one effect of the attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. A second-and far more dangerous-result is the belief that operational art reached its zenith in COIN operations. Advocates of this view support the conviction that no current or future opponent will chose to fight the American military face to face, and instead will opt for insurgency-based warfare. Accordingly, there is no longer a requirement for the American military to maintain the hallmarks of a conventional force such as main battle tanks, strategic bombers, or nuclear weapons delivery systems. Instead, the COIN believers argue for a force structure based upon wheeled Stryker vehicles, light infantry and Special Forces units. This view, that COIN is the ultimate definition of operational art, could not be more mistaken-or more dangerous to the United States.

After nine years of COIN warfare in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. Unit training and mission readiness exercises focus on COIN, almost to the total exclusion of conventional operational art. As a result, the military has an entire generation of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who are unfamiliar with the unique skill sets associated with high intensity conflict (HIC). They have never performed a battalion or brigade level fire mission. They have never attempted a breaching operation against an entrenched enemy. They have never maneuvered as a division or corps sized formation. More importantly, they have never executed AirLand Battle. The failure to look beyond zebra has struck the United States military again. The armed forces are trained and ready to conduct COIN but are ill prepared for general war.

COIN believers argue this approach makes sense given the very real threat posed by insurgent movements and the ratio of COIN to HIC conflicts fought by the United States since 1776. Under that narrow lens, they would be correct. A less myopic view illustrates the difference between the threat of Islamic terrorism and the existential danger posed by conventional warfare waged through operational art. Only a very naïve person would conclude other nation states, such as China or India, do not pose a danger to the United States. Light infantry and wheeled armored personnel carriers (APCs) may be part of the force that fights in the next general war, but they will not dominate the battlefield. Today’s junior officers have a wealth of experience at conducting small raids and creating local government, but they cannot sequence operations across a conventional corps battlespace. Simply stated, they are unprepared for conventional war.

History is replete with examples of militaries that failed to look beyond zebra. During the American War of Independence, the British were unable to adapt to the guerilla tactics of Nathanael Greene in the southern colonies. General Charles Cornwallis, the senior British commander, failed to recognize the unique character of the war and the impact of his operations on the populace at large. Cornwallis had a number of options available to confront Greene, but was unable to make changes within his own operational art (John Dederer, Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathanael Green’s Southern Campaigns and Mao Tse-Tung’s Mobile War, Journal of the West, 1983).

In the 20th century, France’s horrific experience with trench warfare during WWI led to a defensive mindset, the creation of the Maginot Line, and a loss to the maneuver-oriented German Wehrmacht. To quote author Len Deighton, "the Maginot Line was a formidable barrier not so much against the German Army as against French understanding of modern war" (Blitzkrieg, Castle Books, 2000).

Will the United States make the same mistake with COIN? American military leaders must understand that operational art will never reach an endstate. War is a living organism that evolves over time. The United States Armed Forces are in grave danger of forgetting their primary mission-to defend the nation against all enemies, foreign and domestic, be they insurgents, terrorists, or even regular armed forces. COIN doctrine must not become the American Maginot Line. America must look beyond zebra and stand ready for the next war.

About the author:
Major Chris Heatherly is an active duty U.S. Army military intelligence officer with deployments to Iraq, Kuwait, Mali and Nigeria. He is currently assigned to the School of Advanced Military Studies in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The opinions expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or the United States Army.

For further reading he suggests "The Loose Marble and the Origins of Operational Art," by James Schneider, Parameters (March 1989); "In the Words of Alfred Adler;"  and, of course, On Beyond Zebra, by Dr. Seuss (Random House, 1955).